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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellees concur generally with the Issues Presented for
Review and the Standard of Review as set out by appellants.
However, with regard to the constitutionality of the Governmental
Immunity Act, as questioned by issues I and II, as set out in
appellant's brief, we would direct the court's attention to its
holding that legislative enactments receive a strong presumption
of validity and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there
is no reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as
conforming to constitutional requirements.

Authority:

In re

Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct. No. Cs-1. 754 P.2d 633 (Utah
1988) .
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
United States Constitution
Amendment XIV, Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in. the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.

No State shall make

or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
1

Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Article I, Section 11
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Article I, Section 24
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended
Section 63-30-11
(1)

A claim arises when the state of limitations that would

apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2)

Any

person

having

a

claim

for

injury

against

a

governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim
is characterized as governmental.
(3)

(a)

The notice of claim shall set forth:
2

(i)
(ii)

a brief statement of the facts;
the nature of the claim asserted; and

(iii)

The damages incurred by the claimant so far

as they are known.
(b)

The notice of claim shall be signed by the person

making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal
guardian, and shall be directed and delivered to the responsible
governmental entity according to the requirements of Section 6330-12 or 63-30-13.
(4)

(a)

If the claimant is under the age of majority, or

mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned
at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court
to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b)

(i)

After hearing and notice to the governmental

entity, the court may extend the time for service of notice
of claim.
(ii)

The court may not grant an extension that

exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension,
the court shall consider whether the delay in serving the notice
of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in
maintaining its defense on the merits.
Section 63-30-13
A

claim

against

a

political

subdivision

or

against

its

employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of

3

authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time
granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellees accept the Statement of the Case with regard to
Nature, Proceedings, and Disposition as stated by the plaintiff
with the following additions.
Plaintiff indicates that Mr. Thomas S. Taylor, the prior
counsel in the case, made numerous attempts to communicate with the
defendants.
1989.

He subsequently wrote a letter dated September 12,

The notice period for filing a claim expired on September

11, 1989.

Furthermore, defendant James R. Mathis, the airport

manager for Provo City, did not receive any of the telephonic
communications alleged to have been made by plaintiff.

See Record

at 54-55.
Plaintiff claims that he was unable to file a notice of claim
against defendants until we had

responded

to his

letter of

September 12, 1989, with our letter of December 5, 1989.
Record at 15-16.

See

The plaintiff's letter asks for information

regarding insurance and our response simply stated that we did not
have copies of that insurance on file. Plaintiff's claim, as well
as his complaint, alleged inter alia, that the claim or complaint
was based on defendants' failure to enforce and require compliance
with city, state and federal regulations concerning the safety and
4

airworthiness of Warren's aircraft.

See Record at 1-8, 11-14.

Both the notice of claim and the complaint went well beyond
defendants1 response to plaintiff's letter and could therefore have
been alleged in a more timely manner. The trial court states that
plaintiff's notice of claim filed on March 30, 1990 was clearly
untimely.

The court further added:

. . . that plaintiff's own negligence prohibited him from
filing a timely notice of claim; however, even assuming
that defendants intentionally concealed the insurance
policies noted by plaintiff, such concealment did not
prevent plaintiff from filing an adequate notice of claim
within the statutory period.
Record at 62.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the notice
of

claim

provisions

(hereinafter

referred

constitutional.

of
to

Utah

Code Ann.

as Governmental

§

63-30-1,

Immunity

et seq.

Act), are

The notice of claim provisions serve legitimate

legislative objectives and purposes.

The vast majority of courts

that have considered this issue have found such provisions to be
constitutional and not in violation of either equal protection or
due process provisions of federal or state constitutions.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act creates a means by which
a citizen can sue the government for wrongs which they believe they
have suffered. It creates remedies as opposed to taking them away.
It clearly does not violate the open courts clause of the Utah
Constitution.

It does require a notice of claim to be made within

one year from when the claim arises, but allows a person to then
sue the governmental entity if the matter is not resolved.
5

If a

person fails to comply with the procedures of the Governmental
Immunity Act, they are left without a remedy, but that is true with
all procedural mandates and is not unusual or singular with the
Governmental Immunity Act,
Plaintiff argues that the discovery rule should be applied to
the circumstances of this case. Whether or not the discovery rule
is considered in this case, it is not relevant to the disposition.
Plaintiff should have discovered his cause of action well before
the running of the one-year notice period.

His allegations

indicate that he claims many matters beyond the scope of the brief
discovery that he conducted.

All of this indicates that he could

have filed a timely claim had he been diligent. This court should
find, as did the trial court, that plaintiff was negligent and
therefore the discovery rule is inapplicable.

ARGUMENT
I
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION OR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
A,

Utah

has Upheld

the Notice

of

Claim

Provision as

Constitutional•
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the majority of courts in
the United States in holding that the special notice of claim
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are valid and
constitutional, holding that such laws serve legitimate legislative
objectives and purposes.

See 18 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §53.152 (3d
6

Ed. 1984).

In Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977), this

court considered the very same issues presented in appellant's
argument in this case.

This court stated:

While aware that some state courts have invalidated
similar notice of claim requirements, holding that they
violate equal protection, this court is not prepared to
do so, finding rational basis for the classification.
Id. at 193. In making the statement, this court considered some of
the cases cited by appellant in his brief, namely: Hunter v. North
Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975); Turner v.
Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973); and Reich v. State
Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
This court has continued to follow the holding of Sears, in
every case where the issue has been raised since 1977.

In Madsen

v. Borthick, this court stated:
Section 63-3 0-11 sets out a notice requirement, and
Section 63-30-12 spells out the effect of failing to
comply with the requirement. Section 63-30-11 provides
that before a plaintiff may maintain an action against
the state, he or she must file a notice of claim with the
appropriate state entity. Section 63-30-12 provides that
an action against the state is barred if the required
notice is not filed. It therefore makes failure to give
notice grounds for dismissal. A plan reading of those
sections indicates that no suit against the state may be
maintained if notice is not given. We therefore conclude
that service of notice is a precondition to suit.
769 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1988).
against

the

state

of

Utah,

While Madsen involved a suit

Section

63-30-13

parallels

the

provisions of Section 63-3 0-12 but applies them to subdivisions of
the State of Utah such as the City of Provo.
As recently as May of 1991, this court has recognized the
validity of the notice of claims requirement. In Standard Federal
7

Savings & Loan Association v, Kirkbridef 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 6
(1991), this court in discussing the legislature's ability to cut
off

claims,

gave

as

an

example,

Section

63-3 0-13

of

the

Governmental Immunity Act which provides, that "a claim against a
political subdivision . . .

is barred unless notice of claim is

filed . . . within one year after the claim arises . . . ."
(Emphasis in original.)
B.

There

is no Trend

Toward

Holding

Notice

of Claim

Provisions Unconstitutional.
Appellants would have this court believe that there is a
strong trend

towards finding notice of claims provisions in

Governmental Immunity Acts unconstitutional based on due process
and equal protection.
considered

this

Such is not the case.

specific

issue

in

Sears

in

Since this court
1977, only

two

additional jurisdictions were cited by plaintiff that were not
cited by the decision in Sears.
Hospital, 394 N.W.2d

776

See Miller v. Boone County

(Iowa 1986) and OfNeil v. City of

Parkersburq, 237 S.E.2d 504 (W.Va. 1977).

In 1978 the Colorado

Supreme Court considered a similar issue in Fritz v. Regents of
University of Colorado, 586 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978).

The court

recognized that a provision similar to that in our Governmental
Immunity Act did result in the establishment of two different
classes.

There are those persons who are damaged by a tort

committed by a public entity and also those persons damaged by a
tort committed by a private person.

8

However, the court rejected

the

appellant's

argument

unconstitutional.

that

such

a

distinction

is

The court stated:

Absent a "suspect" classification or infringement upon
a fundamental right, both of which are absent here, our
analysis of a statute attacked on equal protection
grounds depends upon whether the statute rationally
furthers the legitimate state interest.
Id. at 25.
(Citing San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).
The

court

noted

that the notice requirement

rationally

furthers legitimate state interests.
Those interests include fostering prompt investigation
while the evidence is still fresh; repair of any
dangerous condition; quick and amicable settlement of
meritorious claims; and preparation of fiscal planning
to meet any possible liability.
Id.

The court also notes that in light of the number of public

entities, the notice of claims provision provides: " . . . certain
means by which the state or its subdivisions may be alerted to
potential liability arising from a governmental activity." Id.
Plaintiff argues that these same reasons could be applied to
private tort-feasors and for some reason, are therefore invalid.
The fact that a valid legislative purpose in enacting one statute
might

be

applied

in

a

different

case,

does

not

make

the

justification invalid.
It

should

be

noted

that

private

tort-feasors

such

as

businesses are free to choose what services they provide and can
structure their operations to avoid or minimize tort liability.
Governments, however, are generally not free to choose the services
they provide, but must provide essential government services such
as police and fire protection, etc. Additionally, governments are
9

accountable to the people, who may replace government officials if
the government is not responsive or abusive of the immunity that
has been granted to them.

These considerations combined with the

fact that businesses are motivated by profit are reasons for a
separate and distinct classification for government in regard to
immunities.
The Colorado Supreme Court also rejects as being contrary to
the weight of judicial authority, the rationale espoused in the
cases relied upon by appellants (Reich v. State Highway Department,
Turner v. Staggs, Hunter v. North Mason High School, and O'Neil v.
City of Parkersburg) (citations omitted).
The federal circuits that have been confronted with this issue
have also held that notice of claim provisions do not violate due
process or equal protection. In Grimes v. Pearl River Valley Water
Supply District, 930 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit,
considering a Mississippi statute, faced an argument from the
plaintiffs in that case that the provision violated the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The court, citing cases in the Third and Tenth Circuits, held that
the immunity statute does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Using a rational basis test, the court stated
that plaintiffs had not shown how this scheme was irrational and
the court added, ". . .we cannot conceive how they could meet this
burden." Id. at 444.

The court also found that the Mississippi

statute did not violate the due process clause even though in that

10

case plaintiffs did not have a right to sue the government agency
involved under the Mississippi Governmental Immunity Act.

The

court said:
• . . even if there were a protected property interest,
plaintiffs were not deprived the process that was due
them. They had plenty of opportunity to contest the
sovereign immunity scheme during the legislative process.
A legislature provided all the process that was due.
Id. In our case, the appellant's due process rights are much less
restricted than under the Mississippi scheme. In Utah, plaintiffs
had a right to sue the municipality, but were merely required to
file a notice of claim as a condition for bringing that suit. It
should also be noted that the Utah statute allows one year in which
to bring the notice of claim.
upon

by

plaintiff,

where

In the four principal cases relied

the

courts

held

that

the

notice

requirements were unconstitutional, the period allowed to bring the
notice was much shorter.

In O'Neil, 237 S.E.2d at 506, the period

allowed to bring the notice of claim was only 30 days.

In Miller,

394 N.W.2d at 776, a person had to commence a lawsuit within six
months or have sent the written notice of claim within 60 days from
the injury.

Reich, 194 N.W.2d at 702, also involved a 60-day

notice provision.

Finally, in Hunter, 539 P. 2d at 846, the

Washington statute allowed 120 days in which to bring a formal
notice of claim.

While the decisions in these cases did not

necessarily evolve around the shortness of the notice period, it
may well have been a factor in the total consideration of the
court.

11

In their brief, plaintiff relies heavily upon two Utah Supreme
Court cases. The first, Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech AircraftP 717
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), deals primarily with the Utah Constitution
article I, section 11, the open courts clause.

(See II below.)

However, the issue in that case was the constitutionality of a
statute of repose.

Such a statute is not an issue in this case.

The second case that plaintiff relies heavily upon is Condemarin
v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).

Plaintiffs can

find no comfort in the Condemarin case. The issue before the court
in that case was the constitutionality of the cap or recovery
limits set within the Governmental Immunity Act.

The holding was

very narrow and dealt only with the fact that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the University Hospital. The court
discussed the historical unfairness of the Doctrine of Governmental
Immunity. However, this "unfairness" has been remedied in Utah by
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The Act provides a means by

which aggrieved citizens can sue the government. There is nothing
within the Condemarin case that would indicate that the notice of
claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act violate
either equal protection or due process.
In regards to fundamental fairness, judicial immunity presents
the same "unfairness" problems as governmental immunity, the Courts
realized and held that to perform their crucial judicial function,
immunity

is

necessary.

Likewise,

governmental

immunity

is

necessary for governments to perform their crucial governmental
functions.
12

In Mountain Fuel SUDPIV V. Salt Lake City, 752 P. 2d 884 (Utah
1988), this court held that based upon its past decisions, the
standard of scrutiny applied under article I, section 24, of the
Utah Constitution, met or exceeded that mandated by the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the
federal courts.

Therefore, if a statute passes muster under

article I, section 24, it will also pass federal muster.
890.

The

test

established

in

that

case

was

Id. at

whether

the

classification of those subject to legislation was a reasonable one
and bore a reasonable relationship
legitimate legislative purpose.

to the achievement of a

This court has already held in

Sears, that there is a rational basis for the classification and
treatment of the different types of tort victims discussed by
plaintiff in his brief.
It is a well-established rule that legislative enactments
are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and
will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no
reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as
conforming to constitutional requirements.
(Citation
omitted.)
In evaluating constitutional challenges to
statutes, the court looks to "reasonable or actual
legislative purposes" rather than to "any conceivable
reason for the legislation," Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d
661, 671 n. 14 (Utah 1984) , and will construe statutes
to "effectuate the legislative intent" while avoiding
interpretations
that
conflict
with
relevant
constitutional mandates. (Citation omitted.)
In re Criminal Investigation, 7 Dist. Ct. No. Cs-1, 754 P.2d 633,
640 (Utah 1988) .
It is clear from the holdings of this court cited above and
from the vast majority of other courts that have considered this
issue that there is a rational basis for requiring the Notice of
Claim provisions within Governmental Immunity Act.
13

The one-year

notice provisions of the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act are

constitutional and should continue to be upheld by this court.
II
THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IS NOT
VIOLATED BY THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Appellants

in

their

brief

have

completely

misread

or

misunderstood the requirements of the Open Courts Clause of the
Utah Constitution.

Article I, section 11, requires:

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const, art. I, § 11.
Plaintiffs cite the two-part analysis set out in Berry and
reiterated in Condemarin which states:
First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative
remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of his
constitutional interest . . . .
Second, if there is no
substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of
the remedy or cause of action may be justified only if
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated
and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not
an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective.
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680; Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 357-58.
The second portion of this test only arises in a situation
where the legislature has taken away some legal right. An example
often used is the right of an employee to sue their employer. When
the legislature established that provision, they also established
workers compensation which satisfied this two-pronged test.
14

In

this case there is no interference, limitation or abrogation of any
existing right. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was created in
order

to provide

a means

for

citizens with

complaints and

grievances to sue the government. It did not abrogate or eliminate
such a right.

Appellant complains that plaintiff has lost his

existing remedy but remains without recourse to an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy. There is no requirement to provide
an alternative remedy if there is a satisfactory initial remedy.
In this case, there is an initial remedy which is filing a notice
of claim within one year.

Plaintiff's dilatory conduct which

resulted in his failure to file a claim within one year is the
reason that the remedy is lost. Since the first part of this twopart test is not at issue, the second part also does not become a
question of relevance in this case.
In Cruz v. Wright, 765 P. 2d 869 (Utah 1989) , this court stated
that nowhere in this state's jurisprudence is it suggested that
article I, section 11, flatly prohibits the legislature from
altering or even abolishing certain rights.
In fact, in Berry we specifically
legislature may eliminate or abrogate
entirely if there is sufficient
elimination or abrogation "is not
unreasonable means [of] achieving the

stated that the
a cause of action
reason and the
an arbitrary or
objective."

Cruz, 765 P.2d at 871.
In Argument I above, the cases set out there show that this
court has found that the notice of claim requirement is not
arbitrary or unreasonable in achieving the objectives of the
Governmental Immunity Act.
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Plaintiff also cites Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission of
Utah. 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1991), as a case supporting their
position.

First of all, this case once again involves a statute

of repose, which is not at issue in our case.

In Wrolstad. the

statute of repose acted to cut off plaintiffs right of recovery
and was therefore found to be invalid. However, the court stated:
The legislature clearly has power to alter the form of
or to limit Wrolstad's compensation for his disease.
However, to satisfy the open courts provision, the
legislature cannot effectively preclude all compensation
without providing an equivalent alternative remedy.
Wrolstad has no alternative.
Id. at 245.
The facts of our case do not give rise to the kind of analysis
done in Wrolstad or Berry.

In the case of the Governmental

Immunity Act, the legislature has not effectively precluded all
compensation.

It has provided

an alternative remedy.

The

alternative is to file an appropriate notice of claim within one
year of when the claim arises. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act
notice of claim provisions clearly do not violate the open courts
clause of the Utah Constitution.
Ill
PLAINTIFF 18 BARRED FROM RECOVERY FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISION OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT.
A.

Plaintiff's Notice of Claim was Untimely.

The alleged tort in this case occurred on or before September
10, 1988.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that a

person having a claim for injury must file a notice of claim. Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1953).

Failure to file a written notice of
16

claim with the city within one year after the cause of action arose
bars the claim.

Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985).

Plaintiff filed a notice of claim on March 30, 1990.

Refer to

Exhibit 3, Record pages 11-14. Utah Code Ann., § 63-30-13 (1953),
requires that a claim against a political subdivision of the state
must be filed with the governing body of the political subdivision
within one year after the claim arises or the claim is barred. In
this case, the claim arose on or before September 10, 1988.

A

claim would have to have been filed not later than September 11,
1989 in order to be timely. The notice of claim filed by plaintiff
on March 30, 1990, was clearly not timely.

In Madsen, this Court

concluded that service of the notice of claim was a precondition
to suit. 769 P.2d at 249.

The trial court in this case reviewed

the facts and the law and concluded that plaintiff's notice of
claim was clearly untimely.

See Record at 62.

Plaintiffs defend their untimely claim by alleging that they
attempted to make numerous telephone inquiries to Provo City during
the summer of 1989.

Record at 27-3 6.

In neither of these

affidavits do the affiants claim that they ever made contact with
Mr. James Mathis, who was the airport manager of Provo City.

To

the contrary, Mr. Mathis states that the first contact he had with
Mr. Tom Taylor, then the attorney for plaintiffs, or anyone else
associated with the Warrens, was a letter dated September 12, 1989.
See Exhibit 1, Record at 54 and 55. Mr. Taylor did write a letter
to Mr. Mathis dated September 12, 1989, asking about the insurance
carried by the Western Flying Club, who had leased the plane to the
17

Warrens, See Record at 16. After receiving the letter, Mr. Mathis
contacted the City Attorney, Gary Gregerson, who then made contact
with the Western Flying Club by letter dated September 19, 1989.
See Record at 50. Mr. Gregerson did not receive a response to his
letter to the Western Flying Club, so on December 5, 1989, he
responded to Mr. Taylor.

See Record at 15.

There is no indication that Provo City or any of its employees
attempted to avoid responding to any inquiries concerning this
case.

Provo City had no reason to believe that it would ever be

a defendant in this case.

Mr. Taylor's letter of September 12,

1989, was clearly not a notice of claim.

See Record at 16.

The

inquiry from plaintiff's counsel only involved whether or not
Western Flyers Club had filed a copy of its insurance with the
Airport Manager.

Failure of the "club11 to do so, or of Provo City

to require such could not have been a cause of the subsequent
accident in Nevada.

There was no motive to delay plaintiff from

gaining information.

Furthermore, Provo City does not avoid or

delay responding to inquiries from citizens for any such reason.
Plaintiff knew he had been in a plane crash on September 10,
1988.

Counsel knew, or should have known, that the statute

required a notice of claim to be filed within one year from the
date the cause of action arose.

Plaintiff's counsel did not file

a claim until March 30, 1990, over six months late.

His initial

inquiry for information was made on September 12, 1989, after the
statute had run. Appellants argue that they had no way of knowing
that

Provo

City was

a potential
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defendant

until

Provo City

responded to counsel's letter on December 5, 1989.

The statute,

however, does not allow a plaintiff to sit on his rights until
after the year has run and then begin discovery only to find out
that perhaps a cause of action might exist. That is what occurred
in this case.

Counsel for plaintiffs indicated that he attempted

numerous times in June, July and August to contact Provo City.
However, he never reduced these inquiries to writing until after
the time to file a notice of claim had expired.

Furthermore, the

person with whom he needed to contact in Provo City, Mr. Mathis,
indicates that he did not receive any of these telephone inquiries.
See Record at 54 and 55.
B.

The "Discovery Rule" Does Not Help Plaintiff.

Appellants rely heavily upon the case of Myers v. MacDonald,
635

P. 2d

84

(Utah

1981),

which

involves

a

situation

where

plaintiffs were unaware that their ward had been killed in an
accident until after the statute of limitations had run.

In that

case there was no "triggering mechanism" to cause them to seek out
information to see if their ward had been killed.

In this case,

however, there was the plane crash which occurred on September 10,
1988.

All statute of limitations regarding the flying clubs and

others began to run on that date.

Plaintiffs had an affirmative

obligation to seek out all information that might identify who was
responsible for their accident.

Any cause of action that might

accrue against defendants in this case, should have been discovered
during that period of time and a timely notice of claim made by
September 11, 1989.
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1.

Plaintiff was Dilatory in his Discovery Efforts.

The Myers case creates two exceptions to the normally
very rigid rule regarding statutes of limitations.

One exception

is the discovery rule whereby the statute does not begin to run
until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of
action.

Plaintiffs rely on this rule to justify their untimely

notice of claim.

Of course, the court emphasizes that mere

ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent
the running of the statute. That is the situation here. Plaintiff
had a year from the date of the accident to file a claim.

Counsel

did not make a written inquiry for information about insurance
until after the statute had already run.

This is clearly a

situation where counsel's ignorance of an alleged cause of action
was caused by counsel's own dilatory behavior in not making written
inquiry at an earlier time.

Appellants cite Foil v. Ballinqer,

where the court said:
To say that a cause of action accrues to a person when
she may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time,
that it accrues before she has or can reasonably be
expected to have knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon
her is patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She cannot
maintain an action before she knows she has one. To say
to one who has been wronged, "you had a remedy, but
before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law
stripped you of your remedy" makes a mockery of the law.
(Emphasis added.)
601 P.2d 144, 148-9 (Utah 1979).

This case merely restates the

discovery rule as subsequently cited in the Myers case.

Once

again, however, as in the Myers case, mere ignorance does not
excuse a timely filing.
reasonably

be

expected

Here the court uses the phrase, "can
to

have
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knowledge"

as

a

caution

to

plaintiffs.

In the case of the Governmental Immunity Act and its

requirement that a claim be filed within one year, a person cannot
bide their time until that period has run, then seek information,
and then decide to file a claim. Even though the discovery is made
after the one year has run, the person could reasonably have made
such inquiry long before the one-year period expired.

In this

case, plaintiffs admit that they began to seek information as early
as June of 1989.

However, their efforts were less than meager.

A letter written in June of 1989, would have established a time
frame from which valiant efforts of discovery began.
2.

Defendants Did Not Cause Plaintiff to File an

Untimely Notice of Claim.
The second exception created in the Myers case deals with
the situation where a potential defendant intentionally conceals
information or misleads the potential plaintiff.
Forsman, 779 P.2d 218 (Utah 1989).

See Forsman v.

Counsel for plaintiff in this

case has alleged that defendants intentionally concealed facts in
this case.

There is absolutely no evidence of such concealment.

To the contrary, Provo City has nothing to conceal. The affidavit
of Mr. Mathis (see Record at 54-55) indicates that the first time
he heard from counsel for plaintiffs was when he received the
letter in September, 1989.

If this information was vital to

plaintifffs ability to file a claim against Provo City then an
earlier written inquiry would have been normal procedure.

A

personal appearance by plaintiff or his counsel would also have
been appropriate considering that filing a timely claim is a
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precondition to filing a suit. Counsel failed to do either. There
is no

indication that any

"behavior" by Mr. Mathis delayed

plaintiff in any way.
In making allegations of wrongdoing on the part of defendants,
appellants in their brief state:
A question arises over whether defendant Mathis1 concern
was the legal liability rather than providing information
to the plaintiff in a timely fashion. One might ask why
defendant Mathis did not reply to the numerous telephonic
inquiries and why he did not respond to the plaintiff's
correspondence personally.
Appellant's Brief at 35.
In his affidavit (see Record at 54-55) Mr. Mathis indicates
that he did not receive any telephonic inquiries from Mr* Taylor
or any of the plaintiffs in this case.

Plaintiffs did not write

to Mr. Mathis, but their counsel was the one who wrote the letter
dated September 12, 1989.

See Record at 16.

Mr. Mathis, quite

correctly, immediately referred the matter to his attorney, the
City

Attorney,

requested.

who

then

immediately

sought

the

information

See Record at 50-53.

Plaintiffs argue that defendants should not be allowed to
avail themselves of the "Notice" defense because of their own
misconduct.

See Rice v. Granite School District. 23 Utah 2d 22,

456 P.2d 159, 24 and 26 (1969).

That case stated that where the

delay in commencing the action is induced by the conduct of the
defendant it cannot be availed by him as a defense.

Id. at 163.

Based on all of the foregoing facts, there was no conduct on the
part of the defendant that prevented plaintiff from commencing his
action. The letter of September 12, 1989 only inquired concerning
22

whether or not the flying club had insurance.

See Record at 16.

The response only answered the question of whether or not the
flying club had insurance.

See Record at 50. Nevertheless, when

they filed their claim, they made numerous other allegations. See
Record at 10-13. If they were able to make these other allegations
on March 26, 1990, without seeking any other information, why
couldn't they have done so prior to September 11, 1989, before the
time for filing a claim had run? The only answer is that they were
negligent and dilatory.
C.

The District Court Followed the Law Established by the

Utah Supreme Court.
This court has consistently held that the filing of a notice
of claim is a precondition to filing a subsequent lawsuit.

See

Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980);
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P. 2d 295 (Utah 1988) . The court also holds
that failure to file notice of claim within one year after the
cause of action arose bars the claim.

Richards v. Leavitt, 716

P.2d 276 (Utah 1985). The district court in considering all of the
facts and law in this case reached the same conclusion.

(See

Record at 62; also see Addendum to this Brief, which is the Order
of Judge Boyd L. Park, Fourth Judicial District Court, in the
companion case, where he also concluded that plaintiffs1 attempt
of notice of claim was untimely).
CONCLUSION
In his conclusion, plaintiff states, "this case presents to
the Utah Supreme Court a question of whether the plaintiff Warren
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deserves to have his day in court." In point of fact, he does not.
Violation of rules of procedure can bring harsh results, including
dismissal of lawsuits. However, it should be noted that plaintiff
will have his day in court against the other defendants in this
case, including the lessor of the aircraft, the insurance company
of Mr. Warren, and the Nevada Airport that provided fuel to the
aircraft just prior to the crash.
This court, along with the majority of other courts who have
considered the issue, have found that a notice of claims provision
does not violate federal or state constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process.

The rational basis for this statute,

which supported the conclusion in Sears, remains unchanged today.
This court in decisions as recent as 1991, continues to uphold the
validity of the notice of claim provisions in the Governmental
Immunity Act.
Plaintiffs have misinterpreted the requirements of the open
courts clause of the Utah Constitution.

No right has been taken

away from plaintiff so that there is no need for an alternative
remedy.

Plaintiff had the right to sue Provo City.

However, in

order to do so, plaintiff was required to file a timely notice of
claim.

Plaintiff failed to do so and therefore his case was

dismissed by the district court.

Plaintiff had one year in which

to file the notice of claim, which is more time than allowed in
many other jurisdictions that require notice of claim, including
the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which
allows six months.
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Plaintiffs attempt at a notice of claim in this case was not
timely. Plaintiffs argue that they were diligent in their pursuit
of information and therefore they should be entitled to the
discovery rule.

However, the discovery rule is inapplicable in

this case because plaintiffs were in fact dilatory and negligent
and the rule clearly states that a plaintiff's mere ignorance of
the facts does not constitute lack of discovery. According to the
facts as presented by affidavits from plaintiff's former counsel
and his secretary, they made "numerous" telephonic inquiries in
June, attempting to gather information.

A prudent attorney may

have made a written inquiry to the airport manager at this time.
After more telephonic inquiries in July without success, almost any
attorney would have made written inquiry (and remember that the
timely notice of claim expired on September 11th).

After alleged

further telephonic inquiry in August, what does plaintiff's counsel
do?

He allegedly made additional telephonic inquiries in early

September.

Only after the time to file a notice of claim had

expired does counsel write his letter. Plaintiffs claim that this
was acting "in all diligence" is clearly inconsistent and the
discovery rule is not applicable under these facts.

The district

court so found in this case as did the district court in the
companion

case.

Both

cases were

dismissed

plaintiffs to file a timely notice of claim.

for

failure of

The ruling of Judge

Harding dismissing the lawsuit for failure to file a timely notice
of claim should be affirmed.
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ADDENDUM

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY
**********

GWEN E. WARREN, et al.,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS & RULING ON
DEFENDANTS PROVO CITY AND
JAMES R. MATHER'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

-vsCase No,:

910400252

PROVO CITY CORP., et al.,
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
Defendant.
**********

This matter is before the Court on Provo City's and
James R. Mathis' Motion To Dismiss. The Court having read the
entire file and particularly the defendant's Memorandums in
support of the Motion To Dismiss, and Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion To Dismiss, and having read the cited
cases by the parties and being fully advised in the premises,
makes the following Ruling and Order.
FINDINGS
1. Plaintiffs were involved in an airplane crash in
Nevada on September 10, 1988.
2. Plaintiffs contend their counsel made numerous
telephone calls to Provo City offices during the months of
June, July, and August of 1989 asking if Western Flyers Flying
Club had been required to comply with Provo City Ordinance No.
13.13.060. (See affidavit of Thomas S. Taylor.) Plaintiffs
further allege through the affidavit of Peggy Maciel (Secretary
to Thomas S. Taylor, Esq.) that she made telephone calls during
the months of June, July and August of 1989 to the Provo City
Mayor's Office and to James R. Mathis' office regarding
Insurance required to be maintained by Western Flying Club.
Both affiants allege that they did not get the necessary

information and phone calls were not returned. Defendant James
R. Mathis alleges, by affidavit, he never received a telephone
call or any messages that Thomas S. Taylor, Esq. wanted him to
call Mr. Taylor. (See James R. Mathis affidavit.)
3. Thomas S. Taylor, Esq. wrote a letter to Mr.
Mathis, dated September 12, 1989, requesting copies of
insurance policies that exist or existed on September, 10, 1988
on Western Flying Club. (See Exhibit #1 to defendant's
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss.)
4. Gary L. Gregerson, Esq. responded to Mr. Taylor's
letter on December 5, 1989. (See Exhibit #2 to defendant's
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss.)
5. Plaintiffs filed a Notice Of Claim Of Injury And
Damage with the defendants on March 30, 1990. (See Exhibit #3
to Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss.)
6. Defendants denied plaintiffs' claim on April 27,
1990. (See Exhibit #4 to Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of
Motion To Dismiss.)
7. Plaintiff failed to comply with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act (U.C.A. section 63-30-13 et seq.)
which required the filing of a Notice Of Claim within one year
from the date the claim arises, or the claim is barred. (See
U.C.A. section 63-30-11.) Notice requirement is a
pre-condition to a law suit. (Madsen v Borthick, 769 P2d 245
(Utah 1988)(Madsen A)
8. Plaintiffs contend application of the "Discovery
Rule" is appropriate to overcome the unjust effects of the
statute of limitations, and cite several cases in support of
their contentions. This Court does not find the cited cases to
be controlling in this case as such cases are distinguishable
from the facts of this case.
9. Plaintiffs had both the knowledge and the
opportunity to timely file an adequate Notice Of Claim with the
defendant Provo City Corporation. Plaintiffs were aware of
Provo City Ordinance No. 13.13.060 prior to the expiration of

the one year period from the date of the crash of September 10,
1988. Plaintiffs have alleged that Provo City's failure to
enforce that ordinance constitutes negligence on the part of
the defendants and thus are liable to plaintiffs for
plaintiffs' injury and damages. The failure to have copies of
insurance policies on hand is only one of the alleged breaches
of the ordinance. (See Thomas S. Taylor's affidavit and
Plaintiffs' Notice Of Claims Of Injury And Damages.)
10. The Court finds no evidence of defendants
intentional concealment of the failure of Western Flyers Flying
Club to file copies of its insurance policies with defendants,
and even assuming such intentional concealment, such
concealment did not prevent plaintiff from filing a timely and
adequate Notice Of Claim.
RULING
1. Defendant's Motion To Dismiss is granted.
2. Counsel for defendants is directed to prepare an
order consistant with the above, and submit the same to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to
the Court for signature.
Dated at Provo, UT this 13th day of June^
"BY THEyCOt
PARKr JUDGE
cc:

Wayne B. Watson
David C. Dixon

